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Pelikan’s Antidisambiguation — World War III,  
or Simply War, ver. 3.0 - A Soft Rollout?
Column Editor:  Michael P. Pelikan  (Penn State)  <mpp10@psu.edu>
They called it the Great War, at least until the outbreak of the Second World War, after which it came to be called the 
First World War.  Its causes were complex, 
multi-threaded, and spread out over time.  Fre-
quently-cited were the partially overlapping, 
sometimes colliding web of treaties and alli-
ances that led to disaster, creating apparently 
unstoppable chains of cascading events.  Once 
begun, the only “way out” was “through.”
The result was “…a clash of 20th-century 
technology and 19th-century tactics, with the 
inevitably large ensuing casualties,” a char-
acterization found in the surprisingly good 
(and ever-improving) Wikipedia main article, 
“World War I.”  The technology had advanced 
faster than the tactics, or for that matter, the 
ability to cope with the casualties.  Among the 
new technologies on the battlefield were the 
telephone, wireless communications, armored 
cars, tanks, and combat aircraft.  There were 
new and newly lethal weapons deployed as 
well, heavy artillery, rapid-repeating guns, and 
most despicable, chemical weapons.
The aftermath of the First World War in-
cluded a completely redrawn map, and an in-
ternational community so fed-up with Germany 
that it was deemed a suitable solution in the 
Treaty of Versailles to compel upon that state 
near-total disarmament, (a pact characterized 
in Wikipedia as “neither lenient enough to ap-
pease Germany, nor harsh enough to prevent it 
from becoming the dominant continental power 
again”).  The unintended consequences this led 
to were founded in the bitter resentment that 
bred among the people of that country, offering 
fertile ground for the twisted diagnoses and 
remedies offered up a couple of decades later 
by Hitler.
The Second World War brought even more 
radical developments in the technologies to 
support and advance warfare: aircraft (long-
range strategic bombing, jets, high explo-
sives, nuclear weapons), naval (submarines, 
battleships, aircraft carriers), and of course, 
cryptography (Enigma, for one) and the 
information technology to counter it (Ultra, 
Colossus, ENIAC), leading to advances in all 
other technologies.
Out of the Second World War we came into 
the Cold War, carrying us, depending upon 
the dates we apply, from the late 1940s into 
the early 1990s.  By 
the end of that period, 
we had gone to the 
Moon, heard a young 
Bill Gates’s vision for “a 
computer on every desk and in every home,” 
and seen Tim Berners Lee propose an infor-
mation management system to the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research (better 
known as CERN) based upon links embedded 
in readable text. “Imagine,” wrote Berners 
Lee, “…the references in this document all 
being associated with the network address of 
the thing to which they referred, so that while 
reading this document you could skip to them 
with a click of the mouse.”  (See Wikipedia’s 
main article “History of the World Wide Web.”)
Through the benefits of hindsight, it’s 
possible to see clear threads running from the 
aftermath of the First World War directly into 
the Second World War.  Similarly, it’s possible 
to find clear traces running from the aftermath 
of the Second World War into the Cold War and 
its political and technological “areas of concen-
tration.”  It wouldn’t be surprising, therefore, to 
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find that a kind of “advance hindsight” applied 
to the trends of the last twenty years might 
offer clues to the state of affairs prevailing in 
the world today, and leading into the future.
The realm of activity we arrive at is that 
encompassed in the term “Cyberwarfare.” 
What this term really means, what it captures 
and includes, are matters both of common rec-
ognition by average folks, and yet widespread 
ignorance as well.  Using readily accessible 
information resources, it is possible to become 
reasonably well-introduced to the topic.  I offer 
no apology for referring you, once again, to 
the ever-surprising, ever-improving resources 
available in Wikipedia.  If you haven’t done so, 
and if you’re at all interested, please take a look 
at Wikipedia’s main article on Cyberwarfare, 
at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare.
There are a few aspects of this realm that 
bear emphasis.  The first key idea I’d wish to 
highlight is that the activities encompassed 
by the term “Cyberwarfare” are activities 
undertaken by nation-states.  In the present 
time, there are organized activities underway 
that do not originate simply from adolescent 
hackers or organized crime groups, and that 
are not simply the inevitable consequence of 
inept security or data gathering practices by big 
corporations.  The Wikipedia article I’ve cited 
above begins with a definition of “Cyberwar-
fare” from Richard A. Clarke as, “…actions 
by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s 
computers or networks for the purposes of 
causing damage or disruption.” 
The second point to take onboard is that 
these activities bear the marks of strategic 
planning, well beyond simple identity theft or 
trying to grab credit card numbers to exploit. 
For example, it is a proven pursuit of na-
tion-state-sponsored Cyberwarfare to establish 
layers of hidden infrastructure, paving the way 
for its own further use.  These efforts are most 
successful when undiscovered, and, of course, 
we can’t prove what we haven’t discovered 
yet.  But what has been uncovered, and doc-
umented, are large-scale, organized efforts to 
compromise large, well-established networked 
resources, to put in place identities with ele-
vated privileges on those networked resources, 
and to facilitate follow-on or subsequent ac-
tions.  This is the Cyberwarfare equivalent of 
establishing Sleeper Cells, quietly building and 
placing assets to be activated and used at a later 
time.  This is the specific reason behind some 
of the large-scale compromises of systems that 
are uncovered and publicized after the fact.
What ultimate strategic aims lie at the heart 
of such activities are, for this mere mortal, 
a matter of conjecture, but the potentialities 
inherent in the presence of as-yet undetected, 
in-place Cyberwarfare assets are terrible to 
consider, and important to recognize.  As 
everything we do in normal daily activities 
moves further and deeper onto networked, 
“cloud-like” resources, the potential points of 
impact increase. 
Our routine activities, our use of social 
media, of networked storage and file-sharing 
resources, of network-based entertainment and 
news and information resources, of e-com-
merce in all its forms, are like trails through 
a jungle: necessary to get through the dense 
undergrowth but difficult to hide, and shock-
ingly easy to observe quietly from a distance. 
As they’ve said in the face of previous 
threats, “You can’t stop living.”  And neither 
can the companies and large-scale organi-
zations with whom we deal every day.  Air-
lines, utilities, banks, hospitals, educational 
institutions, government entities at the local, 
state, and national level, all are undergoing 
continual, active investigation and probing by 
state-sponsored entities who do not have our 
best interests among their top priorities. 
Our extensive use of networked resources 
makes those resources a strategic target, even 
though the larger strategic objectives of those 
state-run entities pre-exist.  What we must do is 
become more than passingly-familiar with the 
kinds of tactics and methods in use today.  We 
can learn about these through openly available 
resources.  If you’re in a position of supervi-
sion or ownership of networked resources, it’s 
probably time to become well-acquainted with 
the potentialities, pitfalls, and opportunities 
for action available to you.  Learn what you 
can.  Read what you come across.  Observe the 
actions taken by companies and organizations 
in response to such state-sponsored activities. 
Don’t skip past those stories assuming it’s 
“just another hacker” or “just another company 
caught unprepared.”
It’s important to encounter and get through 
some of the shock of discovery now, under 
circumstances under our control, rather than 
after it arrives at our virtual doorstep amidst a 
real-world incident.
If you’re at all interested, take a look at the 
Wikipedia article I’ve cited above.  Maybe look 
through some of the references that article con-
tains, or jump to related articles and resources. 
Along with the inherent potential exposures 
and vulnerabilities that have emerged, we’re 
also in a time of prodigious blossoming of 
positive, credible resources, freely and read-
ily available to any who are curious, to help 
us come to know the world in which we live. 
The dates associated with wars frequent-
ly mark specific turning points in complex, 
evolving series of events already underway. 
Armed conflict seems most often to start with 
the opposing sides already identified, known 
to each other and to the rest of the world.  The 
outbreak of an armed phase of belligerence 
seems most often to be an extension to existing 
areas of disagreement and concerted action 
taking a more serious turn.  All these observa-
tions contribute to a sense that opposing forces, 
state-run and acting on those states’ behalf, 
have already taken the field and are in action. 
What, specifically, the present day leads to 
is, of course, as yet unknown.  Once whatever 
that is has become known, it doesn’t seem too 
great a stretch to suggest that, looking back, 
we’ll see its roots were present, visible, and 
even identifiable, in the present day.  
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